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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and firm valuation in the context of 
Chinese firms cross-listed on major international exchanges, such as the NASDAQ, New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), Hong Kong Main Board, Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market 
(GEM), Singapore Stock Exchange, and London Alternative Investment Market (LAIM). 
Through the lenses of bonding theory and liability of foreignness-based multinational enter-
prise theories, two sets of alternative hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data 
over a  period of twelve years during 2001−2012. Contrary to the bonding theory, the results 
reveal that the firms listed in Mainland China recorded better valuation than the firms cross-
listed on the international stock exchanges. The more sophisticated corporate governance 
mechanisms applied in international stock exchanges do not always entail better firm valua-
tion. Institutional distance, cultural distance and the distance in economic freedom between 
China and the cross-listing location countries interact with governance variables negatively 
affecting performance of cross-listed firms. The direct negative impact of the three distance 
variables on the firm valuation are also statistically significant. The outcome of Chinese firms’ 
cross-listing behaviours appear to contradict the general bonding theory. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Chinese cross-listing, bonding hypothesis, liability of for-
eignness, institutional distance, economic freedom, cultural distance. 






The bonding hypothesis postulates that firms can encourage higher levels of protection for 
minority shareholder rights by cross-listing on a stock exchange that has a stronger, enforceable 
legal system (such as a U.S. stock exchange), and substitute these mechanisms for weak home 
country governance practices especially in emerging capital markets (Coffee, 1999, 2002; La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Such cross-listed firms, it is envisaged would command higher firm 
value (Stulz, 1999).  However, the hypothesis of the liability of foreignness asserts that cross-
listing, instead of adding value may actually diminish it due to differences in institutions and 
cultures leading to additional costs (Bell et al., 2012; Licht, 2004). The cross-listed firms may 
also find themselves ill-equipped to conform to the stringent rules and sophisticated govern-
ance mechanisms in overseas stock exchanges. Chinese firms, especially for large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are often beset with significant weakness in corporate governance mecha-
nisms (Sun et al., 2006). These firms are relatively new players in both the international capital 
and product markets, and they still suffer from a lack of the international experience and man-
agerial capabilities to integrate domestic and foreign operations and compete successfully in 
the unfamiliar foreign markets. These competitive disadvantage in international experience and 
managerial talent vis-à-vis their counterparts (especially developed country multinationals) im-
pact on their ability to generate higher firm value (Rugman and Li, 2007).  
The above arguments lead to our central research question, that is: Can the bonding hypoth-
esis adequately explain the relationship between firm value and cross-listing found in the lit-
erature in the Chinese context and if not what other factors impact such relationship? Accord-
ingly, two alternative hypotheses are developed: (1) international cross-listing will yield a bet-
ter valuation than Chinese firms listed only on the domestic stock exchange, or (2) international 
cross-listing will not necessarily outperform the Chinese firms listed only on the domestic stock 
exchange.  To test the hypotheses we focus on firms that are listed on China A-share market 





exchanges which include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Hong Kong Main Board 
HKMB, Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), Singapore Stock Exchange SGX, and 
London Alternative Investment Market (LAIM). We analyse the panel data of Chinese cross-
listings over a twelve-year period during 2001-2012. The findings suggest that (a) the Chinese 
cross-listing does not necessarily lead to a better firm valuation and (b) firm value was impacted 
by differences in corporate governance mechanisms across different international. Our findings 
are in line with prior studies. Siegel (2005) found that reputational bonding better explains the 
success of cross-listings as compared with legal bonding for Mexican firms. Sarkissian and 
Schill (2012)’s empirical study demonstrates the non-uniqueness of valuation premium for the 
US foreign listings. They show that the cross-sectional variation in the valuation premium have 
little association with such cross-country institutional features but is mostly related to variation 
in pre-listing valuation ratios. Busaba et al.(2015) show that Chinese companies previously 
listed abroad exhibit poorer post-issuance stock and operating performance in comparison to 
purely domestic issuers.  Consequently, the extant bonding hypothesis can’t capture the rela-
tionship between cross-listing and firm value completely and requires a refinement. Besides 
the above findings, we contribute to the extant literature by developing such a refined bonding 
hypothesis.   
 
2. Theory and hypothesis 
2.1. Bonding theory and the Chinese Context  
Firms can encourage higher levels of protection for minority shareholder rights by cross-
listing on a market that has a stronger, enforceable legal system (such as a U.S. stock exchange), 
thus substituting these mechanisms for weak home country institutions, especially emerging 
capital markets (Coffee 1999, 2002; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). This argument is known as the 





notions of good corporate governance (Jordan, 2006). Bonding is a practice enabled by glob-
alization whereby firms seek listings on foreign exchanges that have high standards, it increases 
firm value as  the firm’s policies are more aligned so as  to increase shareholder wealth and by 
making it easier for the firm to raise funds (Stulz, 1999). This argument was further elaborated 
by Coffee (1999, 2002) who referred to bonding as a mechanism by which firms incorporating 
in a jurisdiction with weak protection of minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms can 
voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement to attract 
investors who would otherwise be reluctant to invest (or who would discount such stocks to 
reflect the risk of minority expropriation).  
Given the above advantages of the bonding effect, cross-listing measures for improving the 
level of Chinese firms’ corporate governance practices have taken place at multiple levels. At 
the institutional level, China’s legislative and administrative authorities, such as the China Se-
curities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and lawmakers, have stipulated more than 300 laws, 
regulations, rules, standards, and guidelines that form the basis of the legal framework on the 
securities and futures markets. The rules on information disclosure, accounting standards, and 
regulations for listed firms are strictly required to be followed. Auditing standards, the separa-
tion of certified public accountant (CPA) firms from the state system, internal control systems, 
and monitoring of related party transactions have been established. The roles of the board of 
directors, the supervisory committee, and the auditors in information disclosure have been 
identified (CSRC Report, 2000). At the firm level, Chinese firms have been and will continue 
to be engaged in listing their shares in foreign markets considered to have superior governance 
systems and in bonding to them by improving their internal corporate governance practices. 
These developments have produced some evidence of improved accounting conservatism, and 
investment efficiency for Chinese SOEs cross-listed on international exchanges (Hung, Wong, 





However, the Chinese context presents a number of unique aspects of the Chinese firms. 
For instance, the controlling shareholders for most large Chinese firms are the state or the gov-
ernment, regardless of the firms’ listing locations, especially for SOEs. The main motivation 
of Chinese firms listing their shares in international stock markets does not seem to be in line 
with most of what has been revealed in the cross-listing literature (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson 
1986; Domowitz et al. 1998; Stapleton & Subrahmanyam 1977). China’s listed firms are not 
characterized by minority shareholder protections. More importantly, firms initially protect the 
interests of their insiders and majority shareholders (Li et al., 2008). Although the primary 
motivation of Chinese firms seeking overseas listing may not be to improve corporate govern-
ance, such cross-listing on an international stock exchange serves as a bonding mechanism for 
the firm’s management to credibly commit to a better corporate governance regime. Thus im-
proves firm performance, given that the Chinese firms are listed on the international stock ex-
changes have to comply with all the rules and regulations in the host markets.  
 
2.2 Bonding hypothesis   
When Chinese firms choose to list their shares internationally, regardless of whether they 
are  SOEs or private firms, they are committed to a more rigorous disclosure standard and 
greater monitoring due to the host country’s laws and regulations, which “bonds” managers 
not to take excessive private benefits and reduces the expropriation of firm resources by con-
trolling shareholders (Karolyi 2006). Previous literature on law and finance, cross-listing, and 
shareholder protection (Coffee 1999; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999; Reese & Weisbach 
2002; Stulz 1999) reveals that strong legal protections of minority shareholders generate higher 
firm value in most cases. Coffee (1999, 2002), Benos and Weisbach (2004) and Stulz (1999) 
declared that firms wishing to raise capital by bonding themselves to protect the interests of 





long-run q (Tobin’s q, the measurement of firm value). One way to accomplish this bonding is 
to use a U.S. listing (cross-list on an exchange like the NYSE or NASDAQ), whose legal sys-
tem protects minority shareholder interests as well as any other in the world to assure that 
minority shareholders are less likely to be exploited. In line with the bonding theory, we can 
expect that cross-listing for Chinese firms can produce bonding effects due to the increased 
monitoring mechanisms by foreign financial intermediaries, which, in turn, increases the firm’s 
value. Thus, the value of Chinese firms listed solely on the foreign stock exchanges or listed 
both on the foreign and the home stock exchanges is higher than that of Chinese firms listed 
solely on the local Chinese stock exchange. 
Financial transparency and adequate information disclosure are also important for a listed 
firm as a means of communication with its shareholders; as such, accounting disclosures rep-
resent an important corporate governance tool to assess the firm’s performance. Therefore, 
higher-quality accounting standards signal the transparency of firm performance and enable a 
wider array of financing instruments (Zhang & King 2010). La Porta et al. (1998) reported the 
index of accounting standards of 49 developed and developing economies around the world 
(China was excluded from their study). The report found that Hong Kong, Singapore, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom have higher average accounting standards compared to 
those of emerging economies. Following three decades of accounting reforms, Chinese ac-
counting standards are now generally consistent with International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
but include local elements. Moreover, when a Chinese firm is inclined to list overseas, it may 
shift to IAS or another method of accounting and financial disclosure that is accepted by the 
host stock exchange where it is listing. The Hong Kong Main Board, Hong Kong GEM, LAIM, 
NASDAQ, and NYSE require that an issuer incorporated overseas prepare its accounts in ac-
cordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or reconcile with the 
U.K. Accounting Standards or IAS. Firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange also need 





Standards (IFRS) or the U.S. GAAP. It is claimed that the United States has the world’s most 
comprehensive securities regime. The country’s securities laws and regulations, administered 
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), generally require firms to make broad 
disclosures about their operations when registering publicly traded shares and/or maintaining 
listings for such securities. In general, host exchanges require the adoption of the U.S. GAAP 
and IASs for cross-listed firms. China has enjoyed the title of fastest-growing economy in the 
world for the last two decades or so. Yet, its legal and financial systems relevant to the stock 
exchanges continue to be less developed compared to those of well-established international 
stock exchanges in the developed world or advanced economies (Allen et al. 2005). Thus, strin-
gent financial disclosures imposed by the Hong Kong Main Board, Hong Kong GEM, 
NASDAQ, NYSE, SGX, and LAIM as compared to the Chinese stock exchanges will lead to 
the cross-listed Chinese companies performing better than non-cross-listed Chinese companies. 
Historically, CPA firms in China were affiliated with government finance bureaus, univer-
sities, or other government-owned entities (Lin & Liu 2009). Since 1997, CPA firms have dis-
sociated themselves from these agencies to address the issue of conflict of interest and inde-
pendence. To help the Chinese-listed firms improve corporate governance, the CSRC issued 
rules regarding the adoption of well-known international auditing firms, including Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, known as the “Big Four.” 
Meanwhile, these international renowned accounting firms operating in China are also the top 
four in China in terms of reputation (Lin & Liu 2009). As an essential component of the cor-
porate governance mosaic, appointing independent auditing firms plays an external monitoring 
role on behalf of the owners/shareholders in attesting to the credibility of accounting and fi-
nancial information provided by management (Ashbaugh &Warfield 2003; Cohen et al. 2002). 
When a Chinese firm is listed in the Hong Kong, London, Singapore, and U.S. markets, the 
listed company must be audited by an independent public accountant that is registered as a 





choice of independent auditing firm becomes important for an overseas-listed Chinese firm in 
as much as such auditing firm must be approved  both in the Chinese and overseas stock ex-
changes. Additionally, the quality of independent auditors will directly affect firms’ corporate 
governance and operations, and, thus their performance (Cohen et al. 2002). Due to their long-
enjoyed preferential treatment from the Chinese government and their reputation for providing 
high-quality services to clients, the Big Four accounting firms have become the first auditing 
choice for Chinese firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong, London, and Singapore exchanges as 
well as the NASDAQ and NYSE. However, a great majority of non-cross-listed Chinese firms 
continue to hire local auditors. Thus, cross-listed Chinese firms that employ the “Big Four” 
accounting firms as their independent auditors outperform non-cross-listed Chinese firms that 
usually hire local Chinese auditing services.  
Although the Chinese firms are forced to comply with the government law and regulations 
in China, but when listed on the foreign stock market they are subject to the  market mechanism 
and regulation of that stock exchange. The enforcement of the Chinese regulations and laws 
may not as effective and efficient as that in the foreign stock market, leading to different level 
of quality of governance between the firms listed in the Chinese stock market only and the 
firms that are also cross-listed in the foreign stock markets. It in turn creates different level of 
reputation for the firms, that is, although the Chinese government imposes strict laws and reg-
ulations to monitor the stock market practices, the Chinese domestic market does not perceive 
this as efficient and effective mechanism for good governance of the listed firms because of 
the low confidence in the enforcement of the mechanism. The Chinese market has higher level 
of confidence in the enforcement of the market mechanism  in the foreign stock market which 
enhances reputation of the Chinese firms. Thus, cross-listing will create a perceived (whether 
there is a significant improvement or not) higher reputation in the Chinese domestic market, 
which helps improve domestic operations leading to better valuation of such firms. 





Hypothesis 1. Chinese firms cross-listed in the international stock exchange will outperform 
non-cross listed Chinese firm in firm evaluation. 
2.3 Multinational Enterprise Theories and Firm Valuation  
The theories of multinational enterprises suggest that in product market firms operating 
abroad face considerable challenges and incur additional costs; i.e., a liability of foreignness 
relative to local indigenous firms in the host country (Hymer, 1960). These challenges and 
costs result from their lack of familiarity with host market systems, lack of experience in for-
eign markets, and the geographic distance between the home and host countries (Hymer, 1960; 
Miller and Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Theoretical argument 
and empirical evidence suggest that Chinese firms operating in the international markets incur 
a liability of foreignness (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Sun, Zhang, and Chen, 2013). More 
importantly, the notion of liability of foreignness may also apply to the firms listed in foreign 
capital markets where such firms incur additional costs relative to their local counterparts es-
pecially when raising funds outside home capital market.  This happens due to factors including 
institutional distance, information costs, unfamiliarity costs, and costs arising from cultural 
differences (Bell, Filatitchev and Rasheed, 2012).  
Firms that are from transitional economies like China where institutional infrastructure are 
underdeveloped often rely heavily on institutional-based strategies, such as their home country 
location-based advantages, as the main source of competitive advantages. Their developed 
country counterparts operating in an environment with a well-developed infrastructure usually 
rely on resource-based strategies such as firm-specific advantages (FSAs) as the main source 
of their competitive advantages (Hermelo and Vassolo, 2010). Since the set of advantages and 
disadvantages are both time and extent specific (Marinova, Child, and Marinov, 2011), when 





home location-based and static sources of competitive advantages are replaced by a more dy-
namic perspective in which advantages are spatial. The advantages that are based on institu-
tional-based strategies in the home country thereafter become less relevant or important, while 
the advantages that are based on resource-based strategies, become a vital source of competi-
tive advantages (Hermelo and Vassolo, 2010).  
Chinese cross-listing firms are generally challenged by the regulatory and business cultures 
in advanced economies and require support from internationally-experienced advisors. Signif-
icant differences exist between regulatory, socio-cultures, and business practices in emerging 
and advanced economies. Operating in a developed country market requires managers of many 
emerging country firms to bridge language and cultural divides, comply with unfamiliar and 
sophisticated regulatory procedures, processes and standards, acquire local market knowledge, 
manage local staff, negotiate with organised labour and other stakeholders, reach higher quality 
and safety product and service standards, adhere to different tax and accounting rules and de-
velop appropriate communications and public relations strategies (Sun, et al., 2013). Managers 
of Chinese firms are used to operating in the business environment with less-developed insti-
tutional infrastructures where there institutional voids exist (Child and Tse, 2001), and are thus 
ill-equipped to deal with sophistications which are present in developed economies that have 
well-developed institutional infrastructures. Since mid-2011, a sizable number of Chinese com-
panies that were listed on U.S. stock exchanges faced accusations and were de-listed eventually 
due to accounting fraud scandal. Recently, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission 
(SEFC) also made public note that there was a lack of qualified auditors Chinese firms seeking 
to trade in overseas exchanges is rising rapidly. This phenomenon suggests that a legal loop-
holes plague the cross-listing standards and procedures for some Chinese firms that cross-list 
and therefore may potentially cause the failure of the bonding effect. Thus, the Chinese firms 






Furthermore, the capital market imperfections in an emerging economy like China may 
require a special application of the general bonding theory. Such imperfections may mean that 
capital is available for most Chinese firms at below-market rates for a considerable period of 
time (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, and Zheng, 2007). State-owned firms may have capital 
available to them at below market rates through a soft budget (Largy, 1998). Such firms do not 
have to hold high levels of cash as credit is readily available and they don’t have financial 
constraints. Conglomerate firms may operate in an inefficient internal capital market that ef-
fectively subsidises new ventures (Liu, 2005). Privately-owned firms may have access to cheap 
capital from family members (Tsai, 2002). Inefficient banking systems may make soft loans to 
potential investment projects (Child and Rodrigues, 2005) such as providing finance with a 
below-market rate of interest. Therefore, for most Chinese firms, accessing lower cost of ex-
ternal financing is unlikely to be the primary motivation for cross-listing in the international 
stock exchanges. Chinese firms arguably do not possess many strong competitive advantages 
compared with their global rivals (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Jiang and Stening, 2012; Rui and Yip, 
2008). This is mainly due to the fact that these firms have firm-specific disadvantages in many 
areas, such as lack of production and technological knowhow, lack of brand recognition, lack 
of management knowhow, lack of marketing skills, lack of quality control systems, etc. They 
often do not have the capabilities or resources to turn firm-specific disadvantages into firm-
specific advantages on their own or in partnership with foreign firms in their home country. 
Firm-specific disadvantages can be compensated for in the international arena by means of 
transfer, acquisition (of technologies, designs, brands, etc.), and internal independent learning 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Marinova, Child, and Marinov, 2011; Rugman and Li, 2007). 
Innovations, knowhow, technology, production processes, marketing, and managerial expertise 
are readily available in developed country contexts where they could be accessed by Chinese 
firms investing outwards (Marinova, Child, and Marinov, 2011). Chinese firms may move into 





their firm-specific advantages (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008). Thus, Chinese firms 
generally pursue more strategic than commercial objectives in their internationalization.   
At the operational level, it is reported that many Chinese companies’ controlling sharehold-
ers and/or company management often manipulate financial reports, with the assistance of 
some accounting or auditing firms (Cai, 2007). The cross-listed firms may still carry these 
practices and face significant challenges when operating in the international stock markets 
where the corporate governance rules are stringent. As Siegel (2005) points out cross-listings 
did not always serve as an effective bonding mechanism for deterring fraudulent behaviour. 
Since 1993, another corporate governance mechanism used in Chinese-listed firms is the su-
pervisory board. It may not be unreasonable to assume that the subsequent introduction of in-
dependent directors could entail conflicts where firms have such supervisory boards. As a re-
sult, the governance advantages once derived from a second listing in the U.S. or U.K. markets 
hardly exist for these companies. These arguments depict a rather different and complex oper-
ating environment in which the Chinese cross-listing firms may behave in a way that is contra-
dictory to the bonding role of cross-listing in general. In other words, the cross-listing on in-
ternational stock exchanges may not improve valuation of cross-listed firms.  
The above analysis leads to our competing hypothesis below against the bonding hypothe-
sis: 
Hypothesis 2. Chinese firms cross-listed on foreign stock exchange will not necessarily out-
perform the Chinese firms listed only on the domestic Chinese stock exchanges. 
In line with the liability of foreignness related multinational theories, the institutional and 
cultural differences as outlined earlier, as well as the differences in the degree of economic 
freedom in China and other developed countries may create significant challenges or barriers 
for the cross-listed Chinese firms to take advantages of the more advanced governance mech-





firms solely listed on foreign stock exchanges or listed both on foreign and home stock ex-
changes may not be as high as that of Chinese firms listed only on the local Chinese stock 
exchange.  Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2a. The institutional distance between China and international cross listing coun-
tries moderate the relationship between corporate governance and the value of cross-listed 
firms, such that the expected positive effect of advanced governance on valuation of Chinese 
cross-listing firms may be eliminated or minimised when institutional distance is high.   
Hypothesis 2b. The difference in the degree of economic freedom between China and interna-
tional cross listing countries moderate the relationship between corporate governance and the 
value of cross-listed firms, such that the expected positive effect of advanced governance on 
valuation of Chinese cross-listing firms may be eliminated or minimised when differences in 
the degree of economic freedom is high.   
Hypothesis 2c. The cultural distance between China and international cross listing countries 
moderate the relationship between corporate governance and the value of cross-listed firms, 
such that the expected positive effect of advanced governance on valuation of Chinese cross-
listing firms may be eliminated or minimised when cultural distance is high.   
3. Variable description and measurement 
3.1. Dependent variable: firm valuation 
Following Doidge et al. (2004), this study uses Tobin’s q as the measure of firm valuation 
or firm performance for examining how corporate-governance mechanisms affect firm value. 
Equation (1) below shows how Tobin’s q is estimated:  
 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛′𝑠𝑠 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖






where i represents Chinese-listed firm i at the end of December for each year t, from 2001 
to 2010. Chinese-listed firms include firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A markets 
(hereafter we referred collectively as the China A-share market), and the overseas markets al-
ready indicated.  TA, BV, and MV respectively denote total assets, book value of equity, and 
market value of equity. All variables in the Tobin’s q calculation are denominated in the same 
currency. To make firms across markets more comparable, we eliminate firms in the financial 
sector, such as banks and securities, investment companies, and insurance companies. Locally 
listed Chinese firms include Chinese firms that list their shares only on the China A-share mar-
ket; dual- or triple-listings are eliminated from this category but are treated as instances of 
cross-listing. Shares only listed on a foreign stock exchange are treated as cross-listing.  
3.2. Control variables  
We controlled for firm size, listing ages and leverage to exclude alternative interpretations 
of the results. The size of the company is used as a proxy to explain bureaucratic inefficien-
cies brought about due to firm size. The log of book value of total asset would be used as a 
proxy for firm size. Since the study is dealing with different markets with different curren-
cies, for uniformity, all values are expressed by Chinese RMB. Firm size of the company is 
used as a proxy to explain bureaucratic inefficiencies brought about due to firm size. Banz 
(1981) finds that small firms generate higher returns than large firms. Lang and Stulz (1994) 
find a significant negative relationship between firm size and performance. Listing age is 
measured by the years listed on the stock exchange. It is argued that older firms are likely to 
be more efficient than younger one, due to the effects both the learning curve and survival 
bias (Ang et a. 1999).The financial leverage could capture the value of corporate tax shields, 
which could cause higher values of Tobin’s q or other performance indicators (Morck et al. 





monitor the firm, leading to better performance (Bebczuk, 2003). Leverage in this study is 
measured by total debt divided by total asset. 
3.3. Independent variables  
The independent variables include corporate governance variables and cross-listing. Fol-
lowing from Bai et al. (2004) the governance variables include financial disclosure, audit firms, 
controlling shareholder, second-largest shareholder, duality between the Chairman and the 
CEO, board size, and independent directors. Cross-listing, financial disclosure, auditing, and 
chairperson and CEO duality are measured as a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is 
cross-listed on international markets, if the firm adopting IFRS, FRS, or US GAAP, if the firm 
appointing one of the four famous accounting firms, if the chairperson of the board is the same 
person as the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Controlling shareholder is measured by the percentage of 
shareholding held by the largest shareholder, second-largest shareholder is measured by the 
percentage of shareholding held by the second-largest shareholder. Board size is the number of 
directors on the board, independent director is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board. 
Table 1 summarizes the description of these variables.  
Insert Table 1 here 
3.4. Moderators 
Three distance variables (cultural distance, institutional distance, and distance in economic 
freedom) are the moderators. Cultural distance is defined as the difference between the national 
culture of the home country (China) and those of the four host economies and district. It is 
measured through the four cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, indi-
vidualism and masculinity, as identified by Hofstede (1983). Using the scores for individual 





Kogut and Singh (1988), culture distance was measured by using a composite variable consist-
ing of the four cultural dimensions. A low score on this measurement represents cultural prox-
imity and a high score means culturally more distance between China and a host economy. 
Economic freedom is used as a composite variable and it’s measured as per  the Index of 
Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This data source provides information about 
a broad range of economic regulatory regime, focusing on the freedom of individuals and com-
panies in a country to pursue business interests, and is extensively used in literature. (Meyer et 
al., 2009 etc.). The economic freedom measurement is based on 10 quantitative and qualitative 
factors, grouped into four broad categories which includes rule of law, limited government, 
regulatory efficiency and open markets. Each of the ten economic freedoms within these cate-
gories is graded on a scale of 0 to 100. The theoretical consideration of this study suggests that 
conceptualisation of economic freedom focuses on the economic regulatory regime which pro-
motes China’s cross-listing activities in a host country. 
Institutional distance is derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicator. The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators report aggregates the individual governance indicators from six dimen-
sions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, gov-
ernment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This compo-
site Worldwide Governance Indicator is useful for broad cross-country comparison. The six 
aggregate indicators are reported in percentile rank terms from 0 to 100, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. 
The institutional distance and the distance in economic freedom are the relative distance 
between China and each foreign stock exchange’s country location and are calculated in the 
same way for calculating the cultural distance. Distance calculation, illustrated by cultural dis-














𝑖𝑖=1       (2) 
Where CDj is the cultural distance between country j and the other country, Iij is country j's 
score on the ith cultural dimension, IiO is the score of the other country on this dimension, and 
Vi is the variance of the score of the dimension. 
4. Method 
4.1. Data  
A panel dataset is assembled according to a broad cross-section of Chinese firms cross-listed 
on various stock exchanges over the twelve-year period of 2001−2012. Data on cross-listed 
Chinese firms are obtained from relevant websites. The primary sources of company infor-
mation are the websites of the LAIM, the HKEx (Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing), the 
SGX and the CSRC. We use the information provided by the Bank of New York on Chinese 
firms that are traded in the United States, including the NYSE, the NASDAQ, the American 
Stock Exchange, and over-the-counter (OTC) markets in the form of American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs). Dual-listed, triple-listed, and cross-listed Chinese firms in the China A-share 
market, the NYSE, NASDAQ, OTC, the Hong Kong Exchanges, and the SGX are eliminated 
from the non-cross-listed database so that only locally listed Chinese firms are included. The 
Chinese firms listed on the American Stock Exchange are also included (there are only six 
Chinese listings though), they are categorized with firms cross-listing on the NYSE. For firms 
listed only on the domestic Chinese stock markets, data is collected from GTA database. Cor-
porate governance variables data is collected from GTA database and annual reports of the 
listed companies. Market data is retrieved from Datastream. Our data sample is for the twelve-
year period from 2001-2012 with 409 cross-listed companies included. Among those cross-





and 34 on LAIM. Meanwhile, during the same time period, there were 1,306 Chinese compa-
nies listed their on domestic exchange only. Our final sample includes 1,714 Chinese firms 
with corresponding sample of firm year observations of 20,580. 
Chinese securities may be traded either in the OTC market or on a national exchange, de-
pending on the level of compliance with U.S. disclosure and registration requirements. A great 
majority of the Chinese cross-listed firms can be classified into the category of the sponsored 
ADR program, which has three levels. Doidge (2004) has shown that the bonding mechanism 
does not apply to Level I or Rule 144A ADRs, and we are exploring the relationship between 
firm valuation and the more stringent disclosure and listing requirements, we focus on two 
forms of cross-listing, namely the Level II and III Chinese ADRs and foreign IPOs that are 
listed and traded on the Hong Kong, U.S., Singapore, and U.K. exchanges. 
 
4.2. Hypothesis testing 
To test hypotheses we used a dynamic longitudinal panel data research design which would 
help us to control for endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. As our dataset has 12 years 
and over thousands of Chinese firms, we adopt a system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) instead of a difference 
GMM estimator. It is argued that Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments Arellano-
Bond estimator by making an additional assumption that first differences of instrument varia-
bles are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, which allows the introduction of more instruments 
and can dramatically improve efficiency (Roodman, 2009). It is also because the persistence 
of the dependent performance variable could cause severe weak instrument problems in differ-
ence GMM models (Uotila et al., 2008). We use the xtabond2 Stata module (Roodman, 2009) 
to estimate the System GMM. We treat all of the control variables as endogenous and the cor-





The following model is developed for testing the hypotheses grounded on the bonding hypoth-
esis: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛’𝑠𝑠 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽1,𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘=1 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽2,𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙8𝑙𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛’𝑠𝑠 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as in Equation 1; 𝛼𝛼0 represents the constant term; “Firm-specific var-
iables” (which also serve as control variables) represent the finance fundamental for each var-
iable (k = 1 for firm size, 2 for leverage, 3 for listing ages); Corporate governance variables 
represent cross-listing, financial disclosure, auditing, duality of chairman and CEO, controlling 
shareholder, second-largest shareholder, board size, and the percentage of independent direc-
tors to the board.. The coefficient β measures the sensitivity of each of these variables to To-
bin’s q. In line with the logic of bonding theory, which postulates that higher governance stand-
ards result in better firm valuation (Coffee, 2002; Jordan, 2006), the higher corporate-govern-
ance standards adopted in the international stock markets will result in better valuation of Chi-
nese cross-listed firms in these markets. Similarly, the variation in the level of advancement in 
the corporate governance in different international markets will also result in variations in firm 
valuation between these international markets.  
To test hypotheses that are grounded on the liability of foreignness perspective, we examine 
whether the institutional distance, differences in the degree of economic freedom, and cultural 
distance between China and the country location of the international stock markets will weaken 
or eliminate the expected positive effect of more advanced corporate governance on firm val-
uation. Thus, we include an interaction term between each of the three distance variables with 
each of the corporate-governance mechanism variables in the model. In line with the logic of 
liability of foreignness related multinational corporation theories, these distance variables will 





the firm valuation, which can explain why the bonding theory might not apply to the Chinese 
firms’ cross-listing in the international stock exchanges. The model is specified below: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛’𝑠𝑠 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽1,𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘=1 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽2,𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙8𝑙𝑙=1 + 𝛽𝛽3,𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽4,𝑛𝑛(𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 × 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙8𝑛𝑛=1 ) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖            (4) 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the firm specific variables and the corporate 
governance variables. Chinese firms cross-listed on NASDAQ show the highest Tobin’s q ratio 
of 2.48 compared to the others. This reflects a relatively higher market valuation compared 
with the Chinese securities listed on the other markets. Another interesting observation is that 
Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore tends to have a lower Tobin’s q on average. 
The bigger firms normally list on HKBM and local China markets. On the contrary, Chinese 
firms listed on SGX, LAIM, and HKGEM appear to be smaller in size. Chinese firms listed in 
Hong Kong normally have higher leverage ratio compared to the firms listed in other markets 
given that these firms are mostly SOEs. Firms listed on NASDAQ have the lowest leverage 
ratio in the sample data. 
For the corporate governance variables, Chinese firms listed on the HKBM have the largest 
controlling shareholders, controlling approximately 49% of the shares of the firm, however, 
those on NASDAQ recorded the smallest controlling shareholders, representing approximately 
26.4% of the shares of the average listed company.  
As for board size; Chinese securities listed on the HKBM have the largest board size com-
pared with the other exchanges, with a mean of 11 board members. However, the percentage 





across the China and Hong Kong markets. Firms listed on the NASDAQ and the NYSE have 
the highest percentage of independent directors on boards. For LAIM, we however, use non-
executive directors instead of independent directors; as most of the Chinese firms listed there 
don’t have the required number of independent directors. Accordingly, while considering firms 
on LIAM, we included only those companies that had the required data.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 reports the correlation between the variables for all the listed Chinese firms. The 
variable of cross-listing has considerably high correlations, that is, greater than 0.6 cut-off point 
(Churchill, 1991) with variables of financial disclosure, auditing, institutional distance, and 
distance in economic freedom. This is reasonable as most of the cross-listed firms would adopt 
the international financial disclosure or local accepted financial disclosure and hiring Big-Four 
auditing services. Since the level of development of institutions and the degree of economic 
freedom in China are lower than that in the advanced economies where the major international 
stock exchanges are located, it is logical that the positive high correlation between cross-listing 
and the distances in institutions and economic freedom, and between the institutional distance 
and distances in economic freedom are also expected.  In addition, these highly correlated var-
iables were not included in the same model for data analysis. Consequently, the high correla-
tions are not a concern for the data analysis.  
Insert Table 3 here 
5.2. GMM Estimator Results 
The results from the system GMM regression models are presented in Table 4. Model 1 
(GMM1) reports the regression with only the firm specific variables that are considered as 





to directly test the relevance of the bonding effect (Hypothesis 1). Model 3 (GMM3), in addi-
tion reports the effect of each individual governance variable on firm valuation. Models 4-6 
(GMM4, GMM5, and GMM6) examine how the distances in institutions, economic freedom, 
and cultures between China and the cross-listing locations interact with the corporate govern-
ance variables affecting firm valuation, providing evidence to support or otherwise reject the 
Hypothesis 2, Hypotheses 2a-2c.   
Table 4 also reports Wald Chi-square test statistic, significance of Hansen test, and AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests. In all cases, the Hansen test and AR (2) test is larger than 0.05, which indicates 
failure to reject the null hypothesis of over-identification and second-order serial correlation of 
error terms.  
Insert Table 4 here 
Model 1 shows that firm size and listing ages are important firm-specific factors that influ-
ence the value of all the listed Chinese firms. Larger Chinese firms with more assets and with 
longer listing history have lower Tobin’s q values, which is consistent with prior findings of 
significant negative relationship between firm size and performance (Lang and Stulz, 1994), 
and an inverse relationship between listing years and the performance of the listed firms (Pa-
gano et al., 1998).    
Model 2 shows that there is a significant negative relationship between cross-listing and 
firm valuation (p<.001), suggesting that the Chinese firms cross-listed on the international 
stock exchanges underperform those listed on domestic stock exchanges. This is in contrast 
with the principles of the bonding hypothesis. Therefore, statistically, Hypothesis 1 is rejected, 
while Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
The effects of each of corporate governance variables on firm valuation are reported in 





and Chairman, and independent director are in line with the bonding hypothesis, but none of 
which is statistically significant (p>.05). Variables of financial disclosure, controlling share-
holder, second largest shareholder, board size are in contrast to the bonding hypothesis with 
the effect of financial disclosure and board size being statistically significant (p<.001 and 
p<.05, respectively). To summarise, of the seven governance variables, two variables are sta-
tistically significant to reject the bonding hypothesis and the remaining variables were not 
found to be significant. 
The totality of the findings on the effects of the corporate governance variables on the val-
uation of the cross-listed Chinese firms as discussed above suggest that the application of the 
bonding theory received very limited empirical support in the context of the Chinese firms 
cross-listed in the international financial exchanges in developed or advanced economies.  
There is a positive and significant impact on firm valuation while concentrated equity own-
ership as measured by the largest shareholder and the second-largest shareholder was found to 
have a positive and significant impact. This result is consistent with the finding from Ang et 
al. (2000) that a controlling shareholder may introduce monitoring or bonding mechanisms that 
limit his or her ability to extract wealth from outside shareholders and hence mitigate the 
agency conflicts. Meanwhile, hiring Big-Four auditing firms was found to be an effective cor-
porate governance practice that would increase the firm performance.  
Building on the Models 1 and 3 presented in Table 4, Models 3-6 report the results of the 
interaction of institutional distance, distance in economic freedom, and cultural distance with 
each of the corporate governance variables. The results show that each of the three distance 
variables has a significant direct negative effect on firm valuation (p<.001). Model 4 shows 
that the institutional distance interacts with financial disclosure, controlling shareholder, sec-
ond largest shareholder, and board size leading to lower firm valuation of cross-listed firms. 





board size are statistically significant at p<.001 level. The results suggest that when the insti-
tutional distance is high, the expected positive relationship between the proportion of the shares 
held by second largest shareholder (of the firms cross listed in the international stock ex-
changes) and firm valuation is negative (p<.001), and the positive relationship between board 
size (usually the firms cross-listed on the international stock exchanges have smaller board 
size) and firm valuation is stronger (p<.001). The rest of the three interaction terms present 
opposite effect, but only one of which, the interaction between institutional distance and audit-
ing, is significant at p<.001 level, meaning that when the institutional distance is high, the 
positive relationship between auditing and firm valuation is stronger (p<.001).  
The interactions of the distance in economic freedom and cultures with the corporate gov-
ernance variables are shown in Model 5. The distance in economic freedom interacts with fi-
nancial disclosure, controlling shareholder, second largest shareholder, board size, and inde-
pendent director leading to lower firm valuation of cross-listed firms. The effect of the interac-
tions of the distance in economic freedom with second largest shareholder, board size, and 
independent director are all statistically significant (p<.001; p<.001; and p<.05; respectively). 
These results suggest that when the distance in economic freedom is high, the expected positive 
relationship between the proportion of the shares held by second largest shareholder (of the 
firms cross listed in the international stock exchanges) and firm valuation becomes signifi-
cantly negative (p<.001), the positive relationship between board size (usually the firms cross-
listed on the international stock exchanges have smaller board size) and firm valuation is 
stronger (p<.001), and the relationship between independent director and firm valuation be-
comes significantly negative (p<.05). The rest of the three interaction terms present opposite 
effects, one of which, the interaction between distance in economic freedom and auditing, is 
significant at p<.001 level, meaning that when the distance in economic freedom is high, the 





the interactions between the cultural distance and the corporate governance variables are sim-
ilar (refer to Model 6 in Table 4).  
The totality of the results presented in models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 4 suggests that the bonding 
effect does not appear in the Chinese cross-listing firms, and the high distances in institutions, 
economic freedom, and cultures between China and the international cross-listing locations 
may be responsible for the lack of  bonding effect, or for even a negative effect of cross-listing 
activities on firm valuation. Statistically, the empirical results provide us with considerable 
evidences to support hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c.   
5.3. Robustness Test 
A series of sensitivity tests are conducted to examine the robustness of the GMM estimator 
method and the empirical results. This study covers the years 2001 to 2012; which included the 
GFC year, that is, 2008. When the crisis hit, firm performance may have been affected. To 
avoid any bias due to the GFC, we cut 2008 data from the whole data set and just focused on 
the period 2001 to 2007, and 2009-2012 to conduct the robustness test. The same measurements 
of the variables were used, and the same panel data analysis was adopted so as to test the 
robustness of the findings which yielded very similar results. The robustness test results are 
available upon request from the authors. 
6. Discussion 
This paper finds that bonding theory may not adequately explain the case of Chinese firms’ 
cross-listings in the international stock markets. The empirical results suggest that Chinese 
cross-listed firms may behave in a way that is not consistent with what one would expect from 
the bonding theory. In other words, cross-listing on international stock exchanges may not nec-
essarily improve valuation of cross-listed firms. The findings lead to the conclusion that the 





home stock exchanges is not as high as that of Chinese firms listed only on the local Chinese 
stock exchange. We suggest several reasons below why the results generated from this research 
are different from the results normally seen in empirical studies grounded in the bonding hy-
pothesis. These findings pave the way for further research. 
The theory of the liability of foreignness and the home turf advantage could be influencing 
the results that we obtained. The accounting frauds leading to de-listing, dearth of qualified 
auditors, and other legal loopholes pointed out earlier may potentially cause the failure of the 
bonding effect. Thus, the cross-listed Chinese firms increasingly struggle to remain competi-
tive affecting their performance as compared to those listed solely on domestic markets. It 
means that the extant bonding hypothesis can’t fully capture the Chinese phenomena. It is pos-
sible that similar situations may also exist for firms of other developing countries that are cross-
listed. Empirical studies are necessary for these countries. Based on the empirical evidence 
presented in this paper, we could refine the bonding theory so as to incorporate the influence 
of corporate governance requirements in various overseas stock exchanges. Consequently, lo-
cation of cross-listing needs to be included as a factor in the bonding theory.  
In addition to the liability of foreignness as an important explanation to the inapplicability 
of the bonding theory to the Chinese cross-listing, a multifactorial theorising approach may 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the phenomena, as the capital market imperfections 
in emerging economy like China may require a special application of the general bonding the-
ory. Such imperfections may mean that capital is available for most Chinese firms at below-
market rates for a considerable period of time (Buckley et al., 2007). State-owned firms may 
have capital available to them at below market rates (Largy, 1998). Furthermore, conglomerate 
firms may operate in an inefficient internal capital market that effectively subsidises new ven-
tures (Liu, 2005). Privately-owned firms may have access to cheap capital from family mem-





projects (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Therefore, for most Chinese firms, assessing lower cost 
of external financing is unlikely to be the primary motivation for cross-listing and it is more 
likely to achieve positive reputational advantage for domestic operations as well as acquiring 
complementary assets so as to compensate for their firm-specific competitive disadvantages 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Zhang, 2003).  
Following the logic of Coffee (1999), it is possible that Chinese cross-listed firms may enjoy 
a positive effect of reputational bonding for domestic operations further improving their per-
formance.  It may encourage investors to believe that firms cross-listed in countries with highly 
effective judicial systems may better regulate themselves and thus act in the best interest of 
their shareholders. Consequently, investors may place higher value on firms that are cross-
listed on international stock exchanges, knowing that cross-listed Chinese firms are expected 
to yield better firm performance compared to firms listed locally under a poor legal protection 
investment environment.  
Chinese firms arguably do not possess strong competitive advantages compared with their 
global rivals (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Jiang and Stening, 2012; Rui and Yip, 2008). This is mainly 
due to the fact that these firms have firm-specific disadvantages in many areas, such as lack of 
production and technological knowhow, lack of brand recognition, lack of management 
knowhow, lack of marketing skills, lack of quality control systems, etc. These firm-specific 
disadvantages can be compensated for in the international arena by means of transfer, acquisi-
tion (of technologies, designs, brands, etc.), and internal independent learning (Child & Ro-
drigues, 2005; Marinova, Child, and Marinov, 2011; Rugman and Li, 2007). Innovations, 
knowhow, technology, production processes, marketing, and managerial expertise are readily 
available in developed country contexts where they could be accessed by Chinese firms invest-





markets with the strategic intent to acquire such assets with the potential to enhance their firm 
specific advantages (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008).   
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we examined the influence of firm-specific factors and bonding mechanisms 
on Tobin’s q for Chinese firms that cross-list on international stock exchanges, and the rela-
tionship between firms’ valuation and corporate governance attributes consequent upon cross-
listing. The empirical results suggest three major findings. First, the results suggest that cross-
listing on international stock markets that have better governance systems does not necessarily 
improve firm valuation of cross-listing firms in the context of Chinese firms’ cross-listing in 
the international stock markets. Second, variations in the levels of stringency of corporate gov-
ernance system across different markets explain the variations in firm valuation. Third, the 
Chinese cross-listing decision may be more simply to derive reputational advantage than com-
monly thought. This finding is also consistent with prior literature that well-performing firms 
do not necessarily enjoy increased valuation on foreign markets post cross-listing and prefer to 
stay in the domestic market (Doidge et al. 2009). 
There are several major takeaways from our paper. First, we use a unique dataset, not used 
hitherto. We examine the issue of the relationships among corporate governance, cross-listing, 
and firm value. Second, to our knowledge, we examined the impact of location of cross-listing 
on firm value for the first time. We demonstrate that any analysis grounded in the bonding 
theory needs to incorporate the location of cross-listing as a factor in the analysis. By proposing 
this, we make a major contribution to the refinement of extant bonding hypothesis. Third, we 
demonstrate that as corporate governance practices differ between various overseas exchanges, 
these could have different impacts on firm value. Based on these findings, we conclude that it 
may not be appropriate for Chinese firms to go to overseas listing blindly without considering 





specific factors are more likely to influence the value of a firm, regardless of whether they are 
cross-listed on an international stock exchange or not. 
The findings may also be useful for various stakeholders, such as the investors and market 
regulators. First, adopting the corporate governance mechanisms required by foreign markets 
(such as Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong, Singapore, and London), does not neces-
sarily mean that these firms improve their performance, although some of the rules and mech-
anisms required by the host exchanges, such as hiring well-regarded international auditing 
firms to monitor financial disclosures, do have a significant effect on firm performance. There-
fore, for the international stock exchanges, a better understanding of the drivers of Chinese 
firms’ going abroad will help guide their policies, including listing requirements and other reg-
ulations. 
By examining the combined effects of cross-listing and corporate governance mechanisms, 
we find that different stock markets have different corporate governance systems to improve 
firm performance, which is country specific. There is no single model of good corporate gov-
ernance, and each system has its strengths and weaknesses. Second, it is worthwhile to note 
that the equity market environment in China has some distinct features compared with most 
developed countries. For instance, there are still a large number of cross-listing firms that are 
state-owned enterprises, and  the government exercises substantial control over operations. In 
addition, the corporate governance practices from the developed culture may not be fully real-
ized in a relatively less efficient capital market like China, which is why we see that interna-
tionally cross-listed firms generally do not outperform non-cross-listed firms. Therefore, the 
effects of different environmental factors should be taken into account when comparing corpo-
rate governance practices in China with those in developed countries.  
As can be seen, bonding theory alone may not be appropriate for explaining the firm valua-
tion, especially when there is a significant difference in political and legal systems, stages of 





the avenues for further investigation is the relationship between cross-listing and firm valuation 
in the context of other emerging economies. Furthermore, multi-theoretical lenses may be used 
by inclusion of relevant multinational enterprise theories such as liability of foreignness 
(Hymer, 1960; Zaheer, 1995), institutional theory (Scott, 1995; North, 1990), and resource-
based views (Barney 1991) as well as looking into the interplay and interactions between firms’ 
external environmental variables and internal resources and capabilities, which determine a 
firm’s competitive advantage and disadvantage, consequently affecting firm performance when 
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Summary description of variable definitions. 
 
Variables Measurement 
Dependent Variable  
Tobin’s q (total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/total assets 
  
Control Variables  
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets of the company 
Listing history Years listed on the stock exchange 
Leverage Total liabilities relative to total assets 
Independent Variables  
Cross-listing Equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed on international markets. 0 otherwise 
Financial disclosure Equals 1 if firms adopting IFRS. FRS. or U.S. GAAP. 0 otherwise 
Auditing firm Equals 1 if firms appointing one of four famous auditing firms. 0 otherwise 
Chairperson and CEO duality Concurrent positions in the board of directors, equals 1 if the CEO and chairperson of the board is the same person, 0 otherwise 
Controlling shareholder Shareholding of the largest shareholder (%) 
Second-largest shareholder Shareholding of the second-largest shareholder (%) 
Board size Number of directors on the board 
Independent directors Percentage of independent directors on the board (%) 
Moderators  
Institutional distance 
The difference between the home country’s (China) governance index to the 
other four host countries (USA, UK, and Singapore) and district’s (Hong 
Kong)  
Economic freedom distance 
The difference between the home country’s (China) economic freedom level 
to the other four host countries (USA, UK, and Singapore) and district’s 
(Hong Kong) 
Culture distance The difference between the home country (China) and the other four host countries (USA, UK, and Singapore) and district’s (Hong Kong) 
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Summary statistics are computed as of December 31 for each year from 2001 to 2012 for firms listed in different markets. 
 







China A A: Firm Specific Variables      
 Tobin's Q 2.11 1.79 0.01 48.67 14593 
 Firm Size 14.46 1.20 5.41 21.90 14599 
 Leverage 0.51 0.35 0.00 16.33 14593 
 Local Listing Years 8.40 4.62 0.08 24.00 13710 
 B:Corporate Governance Variables      
 Financial Disclosure 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 13493 
 Auditing Firm 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 13409 
 Duality of CEO and Chairman 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 12420 
 Controlling Shareholder 38.72 16.38 3.73 99.08 12695 
 Second Largest Shareholder 8.41 7.63 0.06 41.74 12693 
 Board Size 9.40 2.07 3.00 19.00 12465 
 Number of Supervisors 4.07 1.38 1.00 13.00 12470 
  Percentage of Independent Director 0.34 0.07 0.06 0.71 11936 
HKGEM       
 A: Firm Specific Variables      
 Tobin's Q 1.64 1.27 0.44 14.27 383 
 Firm Size 13.14 1.08 10.39 16.16 388 
 Leverage 0.46 0.68 0.06 12.12 386 
 Cross-Listing Years 5.12 3.11 0.08 12.50 390 
 B:Corporate Governance Variables      
 Financial Disclosure 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 387 
 Auditing Firm 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 386 
 Duality of CEO and Chairman 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 370 
 Controlling Shareholder 37.81 17.26 5.83 71.25 369 
 Second Largest Shareholder 13.70 8.20 1.29 49.00 340 
 Board Size 9.37 1.85 6.00 17.00 370 
 Number of Supervisors 3.96 1.14 2.00 9.00 316 
  Percentage of Independent Director 0.34 0.07 0.14 0.57 370 
HK Mainboard      
 A: Firm Specific Variables      
 Tobin's Q 1.30 0.72 0.37 9.56 1146 
 Firm Size 16.93 1.98 13.10 23.59 1153 
 Leverage 0.52 0.24 0.03 1.77 1152 
 Cross-Listing Years 7.46 4.68 0.08 19.42 1156 
 B:Corporate Governance Variables      
 Financial Disclosure 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 1147 
 Auditing Firm 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 1140 
 Duality of CEO and Chairman 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 1141 
 Controlling Shareholder 48.49 15.85 3.69 90.00 1133 





 Board Size 11.16 2.63 5.00 25.00 1142 
 Number of Supervisors 4.76 1.87 0.23 13.00 937 
  Percentage of Independent Director 0.35 0.09 0.10 0.71 1142 
London AIM      
 A: Firm Specific Variables      
 Tobin's Q 1.54 2.84 0.01 37.52 190 
 Firm Size 12.29 2.40 6.61 17.38 210 
 Leverage 0.35 0.26 0.01 1.53 211 
 Cross-Listing Years 3.58 2.61 0.08 15.50 182 
 B:Corporate Governance Variables      
 Financial Disclosure 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 181 
 Auditing Firm 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 185 
 Duality of CEO and Chairman 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 176 
 Controlling Shareholder 39.26 21.76 4.30 95.20 164 
 Second Largest Shareholder 13.61 8.46 0.25 40.31 157 
 Board Size 6.36 1.87 3.00 11.00 176 
  Percentage of Independent Director 0.31 0.12 0.14 0.60 49 
NASDAQ       
 A: Firm Specific Variables      
 Tobin's Q 2.48 2.61 0.19 18.02 235 
 Firm Size 13.36 1.29 10.92 17.46 245 
 Leverage 0.27 0.24 0.03 2.64 245 
 Cross-Listing Years 3.96 2.54 0.08 12.50 243 
 B:Corporate Governance Variables      
 Financial Disclosure 0.90 0.31 0.00 1.00 230 
 Auditing Firm 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 228 
 Duality of CEO and Chairman 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 227 
 Controlling Shareholder 26.39 14.91 5.50 68.10 235 
 Second Largest Shareholder 12.05 6.20 0.50 36.20 225 
 Board Size 6.69 1.63 4.00 11.00 235 
  Percentage of Independent Director 0.55 0.14 0.18 1.00 220 
New 
York       
 A: Firm Specific Variables      
 Tobin's Q 1.91 1.97 0.09 10.45 172 
 Firm Size 14.05 1.41 10.68 17.66 192 
 Leverage 0.37 0.33 0.04 3.88 190 
 Cross-Listing Years 3.93 3.48 0.08 19.67 191 
 B:Corporate Governance Variables      
 Financial Disclosure 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 194 
 Auditing Firm 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 192 
 Duality of CEO and Chairman 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 192 
 Controlling Shareholder 32.63 16.48 6.30 95.10 180 
 Second Largest Shareholder 13.98 6.80 1.08 32.10 159 
 Board Size 7.14 1.55 4.00 12.00 183 





Singapore      
 A: Firm Specific Variables      
 Tobin's Q 1.29 1.60 0.14 39.56 907 
 Firm Size 12.82 1.73 1.95 18.50 927 
 Leverage 0.39 0.32 0.01 6.11 924 
 Cross-Listing Years 4.30 3.08 0.08 16.92 911 
 B:Corporate Governance Variables      
 Financial Disclosure 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00 886 
 Auditing Firm 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 889 
 Duality of CEO and Chairman 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 882 
 Controlling Shareholder 41.72 15.54 7.62 90.67 885 
 Second Largest Shareholder 13.93 7.54 0.82 46.53 885 
 Board Size 6.48 1.52 3.00 14.00 886 
  Percentage of Independent Director 0.43 0.09 0.20 0.75 886 
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 Mean, standard deviation, and correlation* Definitions of variables are same as in Table 1.  
 
 
                  
  
  
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) Tobin's q 2.004 1.776 1
(2) Firm size 14.457 1.545 -0.154 1
(3) Leverage 0.494 0.354 0.121** 0.096** 1
(4) Listing ages 7.871 4.656 0.069** 0.207** 0.150** 1
(5) Cross-listing 0.177 0.382 -0.133 -0.004 -0.084 -0.238 1
(6) Financial disclosure 0.104 0.305 -0.094 0.007 -0.076 -0.238 0.700** 1
(7) Auditing 0.148 0.355 -0.105 0.218** -0.054 -0.183 0.680** 0.520** 1
(8) Controlling shareholder 39.329 16.653 -0.098 0.169** -0.044 -0.198 0.079** 0.028** 0.091** 1
(9) Second largest shareholder 9.120 7.916 0.011 -0.14 -0.029 -0.157 0.192** 0.132** 0.137** -0.311 1
(10) Chairman and CEO 0.181 0.385 0.032** -0.138 -0.053 -0.122 0.207** 0.178** 0.139** -0.04 0.056** 1
(11) Board size 9.260 2.294 -0.065 0.386** 0.058** 0.016* -0.134 -0.145 0.030** 0.037** -0.006 -0.175 1
(12) Independent director 0.354 0.081 0.026** -0.039 -0.026 0.034** 0.264** 0.284** 0.177** -0.084 0.032** 0.182** -0.396 1
(13) Institutional distance 0.900 1.689 -0.133 -0.013 -0.079 -0.237 0.991** 0.700** 0.667** 0.076** 0.191** 0.204** -0.138 0.268** 1
(14) Distance in economic freedom 2.082 3.879 -0.137 0.063** -0.062 -0.214 0.962** 0.621** 0.669** 0.102** 0.176** 0.173** -0.059 0.195** 0.962**
(15) Culture distance 0.234 0.732 -0.023 -0.179 -0.104 -0.206 0.553** 0.601** 0.397** -0.071 0.127** 0.195** -0.259 0.383** 0.558** 0.337** 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).






Two-step System GMM Estimation of Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Cross-Listing, Moderating Effect and Firm Valuation 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's q GMM 1 GMM2 GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 GMM6 
Constant 7.561*** 8.948*** 8.043*** 8.643*** 8.615*** 8.102*** 
 (3.61) (5.79) (4.62) (6.29) (5.74) (5.30) 
Control Variable (Firm-Specific Variable)         
Firm Size -0.382* -0.610*** -0.588*** -0.631*** -0.652*** -0.586*** 
 (-2.01) (-4.15) (-2.95) (-4.45) (-4.24) (-3.68) 
Leverage -3.789 1.032 -0.513 1.013 1.327 -0.184 
 (-1.29) (0.67) (-0.23) (0.69) (0.90) (-0.11) 
Listing Years 0.059*** -0.014 0.007 -0.022 -0.014 -0.015 
 (3.17) (-0.98) (0.43) (-1.79) (-1.05) (-1.04) 
Independent Variables       
Cross-listing  -0.802***     
  (-5.08)     
Financial Disclosure   -0.682*** 0.811 -0.891 -0.571*** 
    (-3.78) (1.17) (-1.35) (-3.15) 
Auditing   0.219 0.462* 0.393 0.228 
   (0.89) (2.12) (1.92) (1.00) 
Controlling Shareholder   0.003 0.007* 0.007* 0.004 
   (0.69) (2.02) (2.02) (1.04) 
Second Largest Shareholder   -0.006 0.007* 0.007 -0.003 
   (-1.29) (2.17) (2.03) (-0.65) 
Duality of CEO and Chairman   -0.132 0.120 0.136 -0.101 
   (-1.24) (1.48) (1.66) (-1.07) 
Board Size   0.107* 0.011 0.023 0.086* 
   (2.28) (0.48) (0.96) (2.27) 
Independent Director   0.179 0.505 0.545 -.240 
   (0.30) (1.03) (1.07) (0.47) 
Distance Variables (Moderators)       
Institutional Distance    -1.106***   
    (-5.45)   
Distance in Economic Freedom     -0.460***  
     (-5.19)  
Culture Distance      -2.260*** 





Dependent Variable: Tobin's q GMM 1 GMM2 GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 GMM6 
Interaction Terms       
Institutional Distance * Financial Disclosure    -0.146   
    (-0.86)   
Institutional Distance * Auditing    0.111*   
    (2.42)   
Institutional Distance * Controlling Shareholder    0.000   
    (0.15)   
Institutional Distance * Second Largest Shareholder    -0.005***   
    (-2.60)   
Institutional Distance * Duality of CEO and Chairman    -0.111   
    (-0.81)   
Institutional Distance * Board Size    0.070***   
    (5.09)   
Institutional Distance * Independent Director    -0.447   
    (-1.96)   
Distance in Economic Freedom * Financial Disclosure     -0.108  
     (-1.54)  
Distance in Economic Freedom  * Auditing     0.066***  
     (3.20)  
Distance in Economic Freedom * Controlling Shareholder     0.000  
     (0.29)  
Distance in Economic Freedom * Second Largest Shareholder     -0.002*  
     (-2.40)  
Distance in Economic Freedom * Duality of CEO and Chairman     -0.054***  
     (-3.11)  
Distance in Economic Freedom  * Board Size     0.028***  
     (4.81)  
Distance in Economic Freedom  * Independent Director     -0.204*  
     (-2.14)  
Culture Distance * Financial Disclosure      -3.918 
      (-0.85) 
Culture Distance * Auditing      10.207*** 
      (3.50) 
Culture Distance * Controlling Shareholder      -1.650 





Dependent Variable: Tobin's q GMM 1 GMM2 GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 GMM6 
Culture Distance * Second Largest Shareholder      -1.906*** 
      (-3.92) 
Culture Distance * Duality of CEO and Chairman      -2.368 
      (-0.95) 
Culture Distance * Board Size      4.100*** 
      (4.87) 
Culture Distance * Independent Director      -1.552* 
            (-2.16) 
No. of Groups 1711 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 
No. of obs. 16599 13932 13932 13932 13976 13976 
Wald chi2 1994.93(13) 2362.91(14) 2126.46(20) 2446.31(28) 2474.11(28) 2615.96(28) 
P-value of Hansen test 0.046 0.267 0.124 0.319 0.305 0.286 
P-value of AR(1) test 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P-value of AR(2) test 0.419 0.267 0.627 0.150 0.035 0.540 
Notes: t-values are reported in parentheses; degrees of freedom in parentheses in the section of Wald chi2   
Definitions of variables are same as in Table 1. t-values are reported in parentheses    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
